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The Role of English Private
International Law in Anglo-
American Decedent Estates
By JAMES HAwRISON CO=N*
During the years since the end of the Second World War, an
increasing number of Americans have gone to England. Many of
them have stayed for long periods, during which time they have
invested in English securities, opened deposit and current ac-
counts, and acquired considerable amounts of real property.
While this little realized but important aspect of Anglo-American
relations has helped contribute to increasing interdependence
between our two countries, it has presented many problems on
the personal level, principally in the field of estate planning.
Because most American attorneys are unacquainted with English
private international law, probate rules, and taxation schemes,
it is difficult for them to deal properly with the English assets
of their American clients in planning for the overall devolution
of their entire estates. Although necessary reliance must, of
course, be placed in the English lawyer, at least during the
period of probate and administration, it would be to the decided
advantage of the American attorney to become familiar with
these aspects of English law in order to cope intelligently with
the antecedent problems which arise during the planning stage.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to confront the American
attorney with some of the problems he faces in planning an
estate consisting in part of English assets, and to present some
of the answers which arise through the application of English
law. To further this objective, I have created a fictitious
person, Preston Peters III, whose circumstances in many ways
* A.B., Princeton; LL.B., Harvard. Mr. Cohen, who prepared this paper as
part of the requirements for a Diploma in Law at Oxford University (Christ
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typify the conditions under which the aforementioned problems
arise: his partial affiliation with England suggests questions of
domicile; his property comprises a suitable diversity of assets,
presenting questions of situs as well as of administration; and the
bi-national facet of his estate presents problems of overlapping
taxation. Although different answers in certain instances may
arise through the application of the law of Scotland or Northern
Ireland, limitations of space require that this discussion be
confined to England.
Preston Peters III is the only son of the late Preston Peters, Jr.,
Boston shipping merchant, and the late Judith Montgomery-
Jones, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. John Montgomery-Jones, British
subjects and residents of London. He was born in Boston in
1897, and lived there until 1917 when his father was accidentally
drowned in a fishing disaster off the Massachusetts coast at
Nantucket. Shortly after the end of the First World War, Mrs.
Peters returned to England taking Preston with her. They lived
in London in a house bought for Mrs. Peters by her father.
Although Mr. Peters had already begun his university education
in the United States, it was decided that he would not return and
instead he matriculated at Judas College, Oxford, in the fall of
1919. In 1922, Mr. Peters married a girl from New York whom
he had met while in America. Although they continued to live in
London with Mr. Peters' mother, in 1924 Mr. and Mrs. Peters
returned to the United States where Mr. Peters assumed an
executive position with a company in New York City. While Mr.
and Mrs. Peters frequently visited London during the next few
years, after the death of Mr. Peters' mother in 1934 these visits
ceased, and they have not been to England since that time. Mr.
and Mrs. Peters have two children, the oldest having been born
in London in 1923, the youngest in New York City in 1936. With
the exception of a summer home in Nantucket, Massachusetts,
all of Mr. Peters' American property is situated in New York. His
English assets consist of the following:
(1) Mr. Peters owns a leasehold in London, having acquired
it under his mother's will when she died in 1934. The lease
expires on December 31, 2010. The term has been valued at
about .......................................................................... 20,000 pounds
(2) Mr. Peters has a 5,000 pounds deposit account with
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Barclay's Old Bank in Oxford, the money being the balance of a
gift made to him by his grandfather while he was an under-
graduate at Judas. The deposit account pass book is in Mr.
Peters' vault in New York City .................................... 5,000 pounds
(3) Mr. Peters owns ten thousand Ordinary "A" shares in
the Rolls-Royce Motor Company, Ltd., which he acquired under
the will of his grandfather upon his death in 1929. The certificates
for these shares are also in Mr. Peters' vault in New York City.
Currently selling at approximately 40s a share on the London
Stock Exchange, Mr. Peters' interest is valued at about ................
........................................................................................ 20,000 p oun ds
(4) Mr. Peters is the life beneficiary of a trust created under
his mother's will. The terms of the trust for the benefit of Mr.
Peters direct the trustee to pay the income to him for life and
then "to distribute the principal to, or for the benefit of, any one
or more of my said son's issue as my said son shall by Will appoint;
and in default of appointment to my said son's children in equal
shares." The present value of the corpus is about 250,000 pounds,
which consists of movable and immovable property situated in
England. The trust is administered by Lloyd's Bank, London
.................................................................................... 250,000 p oun ds
ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
With this background, we can proceed to a discussion of the
important problems which arise in handling the assets which
comprise Mr. Peters' English estate. Foremost are those questions
which concern devolution, taxation and administration. These,
in turn, require an understanding of the English treatment of
"domicile" and "residence"; situs of property; "real and personal,"
"movable and immovable," "tangible and intangible" property;
formal and essential validity of wills; construction and revocation
of wills; treatment of intestate succession; and exercise of general
and special powers of appointment. Our attention will center
upon Mr. Peters' position in relation to his property within Eng-
land, and the way in which this is determined by the applicable
English rule of law. Our point of departure is the outlook for
Mr. Peters, and, of course, for his American attorney.
[Vol. 52.,
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A. DoMncn
Of initial importance is a determination of Mr. Peters' domicile
inasmuch as the application of appropriate law as well as the
extent of English jurisdiction to tax will be controlled thereby.
Although the term "domicile" is often applied loosely in the
United States (frequently being used interchangeably and con-
fused with transitory residence), a somewhat rigid definition has
evolved in England. Inasmuch as the approach to the question
of domicile is fundamentally different in England from that which
obtains in the majority of American states, an English court
of probate might conclude the matter in a manner which conflicts
with the finding of the appropriate probate court in the United
States. In order to understand English analysis of domicile, then,
it must first be understood that under English law residence and
domicile are wholly separate concepts, the terms being far from
synonymous, and the one by no means constituting the other.
While a variety of elements may indicate mere residence, such
as maintenance of a home, exercise of voting privileges, and
length of stay, domicile itself constitutes much more: namely
residence, plus the intention to create a permanent residence.
And when domicile at the date of death is alleged to differ from
the domicile of origin, almost overwhelming evidence will be
required to sustain the conclusion of change.1
While the English rule has long been settled that questions
effecting many aspects of estate planning, principally in the areas
of descent and distribution of movables, are determined by the
law of the place of domicile of the decedent, the method by which
English law has arrived at a determination of domicile has itself
undergone considerable change. One of the earliest cases to
discuss the issue, Whicker v. Hume, relied primarily upon the
empirical fact of where a man's home was established. "By
domicile we mean home, the permanent home, and if you do not
understand your permanent home, I'm afraid that no illustrations
drawn from foreign writers will very much help you to it."2
But even under this overly simplified approach, the choice of a
IWinans v. Attorney General (1902) A.C. 287; Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal
Infirmary (1930) A.C. 588. With respect to domicile of origin, "there is the
strongest possible presumption in favor of its continuance."; Cheshire, Private
International Law 186 (6th ed. 1961).2 Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124.
1964]
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permanent home had to be the intentional result of a voluntary
decision, and "permanent" rather than "temporary" in the most
arbitrary sense of that term. And although the early cases rested
upon the flexible concept of "home," it was not long before this
concept was elaborated to include not only the positive location
of that home but also the negative absence of any inclination to
return to a former home in the event of even the most remote
contingency. As a result of this development, English courts
do today give "permanent" a somewhat inflexible definition, seem-
ingly equate it with everlasting, and invariably conclude that no
change of domicile has been effected unless the intention is
unequivocably expressed to abandon irrevocably the old in favor
of the new. It would seem quite clear, then, that the determina-
tion of domicile rests rigidly upon the present intention to make
a place of residence permanent, which can exist "only where [a
person] has no other idea than to continue there, without looking
forward to any event, certain or uncertain, which might induce
him to chage."4 From this analysis, it would appear that the
English conception of domicile corresponds "neither with what
the ordinary man understands by his permanent home nor with
the [American] criterion of habitual residence."5
Applying these criteria, and assuming that Mr. Peters dies
under the prevailing circumstances, it woud be safe to conclude
that an English court would find his domicile to be located in
the state of New York. Although his domicile of origin was in
Massachusetts and he maintains a summer home there, the "over-
whelming evidence" required to establish the change to New York
is certainly present. Mr. Peters has lived in New York since 1924.
His business is in New York, and all his American assets except
the summer house are located in that state. In the event of his
death the principal administration of his estate would be taken
out in the Surrogate's Court of New York County, and ancillary
administration only would obtain in Massachusetts and England.
3 Even this may be insufficient. See Ramsay v. Liverpool, supra note 1, where
Scotland was deemed to be the place of domicile of the decedent, even though
he had spent the last thirty-sixyears of his life in England and had even expressed
his refusal to return to Scotland.
4 Moorehouse v. Lord (1863) 10 H.L.C. 272 at 285-286; but of., Donaldson
v. Donaldson (1949) 65 T.L.R. 233 and Travers v. Holley (1953) P. 246 as
illustrations of judicial construction of "intent' in a way which tends to mitigate
against the severity of the prevailing rule.
5 Cheshire, Private International Law, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170.
[Vol. 52,
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It is, moreover, highly unlikely that an English court would con-
clude domicile to be in England, in view of Mr. Peters' fleeting
residence there and his uninterrupted absence since 1934.'
B. SiTus
In order for English jurisdiction to attach to any of Mr. Peters'
property, the asset must be "situated" in England at the time of
his death. Furthermore, once an asset is located within England,
jurisdiction over it will not be destroyed by virtue of Mr. Peters'
domicile elsewhere. Although English law employs the conven-
tional division of property into the classifications of "real" and
"personal" for purposes of its own domestic law, insofar as ques-
tions of private international law are concerned, the cases have
relied upon the somewhat different concept of "movable" and
"immovable" property instead.7 Although the domestic and inter-
national conceptions tend to overlap in some circumstances,
they are by no means equivalent, and do not always coincide.
While all movable property is personal, all immovable property
is not necessarily real estate." Blackstone stated as early as the
eighteenth century, that ".... things personal, by our law, do not
include things movable, but something more, the whole of which
is comprehended under the general name of chattels."' Further-
more, English private international law recognizes the concept of
"tangible" and "intangible" property, the former consisting of
movable and immovable, real and personal property, and the
latter consisting of assets of a different nature such as debts and
choses in action.10
Mr. Peters' leasehold in London is the least source of difficulty.
Since it is located in England, it will be English law which will
determine questions of testate and intestate succession to it.
6 Insofar as English income tax is concerned, the basis of jurisdiction is either
residence or citizenship. Thus, a person resident in England, although domiciled
in and a citizen of the United States, would be liable for United Kingdom income
tax, but only with respect to income arising from sources in England. However,
since Mr. Peters is neither a subject nor a resident, he would not be liable for tax
on income from his English assets. 1952 Income Tax Act 15 & 16 Geo. 6 and 1
Eliz. 2 c.10 s. 132(2)1.
7 In re Hoyles (1911) 1 Ch. 179.
s Freke v. Carbery (1873) L.R. 16 Eq. 461.
9 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 385, Vol. II, Chap. 24
(1809).
10 For further discussion, see Lalive, The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict
of Laws (1955).
1964]
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Although a term for years is considered personal property-a
chattel real-under English domestic law, insofar as English pri-
vate international law is concerned it is deemed an immovable.
As a result of this distinction, rights to the leasehold are governed
not by the law which controls succession to movable property,
but by the law of the situs of the real property which is the sub-
ject of the lease. In the case of Freke v. Carbery, supra note 8, a
testator, a domiciled Irishman, bequeathed all his personal prop-
erty, including a leasehold in England, to trustees with directions
to accumulate the income for a period beyond the limitation per-
mitted by the Thellusson Act, the English statutory rule against
accumulations. Although the English statute did not extend to
Ireland, the court held that the leasehold, although personalty
insofar as the trust was concerned, was an interest in an immov-
able and, therefore, subject to English law. As a result of this
conclusion, the provision for accumulation of income beyond the
permissible period was invalid insofar as it applied to the lease-
hold.
With the exception of Mr. Peters' special power to appoint
the remainder interest in the trust created under his mother's
will, all the rest of his English property consists of intangible
assets: shares and deposits accounts. Under English case law,
specific rules have developed which are applied as part of English
private international law. If the asset is transferable by delivery
only, such as is the case with bonds in bearer form, negotiable
instruments and bills of exchange, English law will consider it to
be situated in the place where the paper representing the security
is found.:" The reason behind this rule appears to be the notion
that although bearer bonds, notes or bills are actually only evi-
dences of debt, nevertheless they are in reality a form of chattel
which can be exchanged for full value at the option of the
holder. At present, no such assets comprise any part of Mr.
Peters' estate. Where, however, the estate asset consists of shares
in a company, the treatment of situs is considerably different.
Unlike instruments which can be negotiated by delivery, shares
of stock cannot be transferred without registration on company
books. Because this is so, English law regards shares in a com-
"Winans v. Attorney General, supra note 1; Dicey, Conflict of Laws 506
(7th ed. Morris 1958).
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pany as situated not where the certificates representing the asset
are found, but in the country where registration must be effected
between the shareholder and the company in order to transfer
the interest.12 This rule appears to obtain even though the stock
certificate may have been endorsed in blank and transferred by
delivery, thereby giving the transferee a right of registration
against the company.'3 The English rule with respect to the
situs of company shares differs considerably from the New York
rule which emphasizes the tangible character of the certificate
which represents the interest.14 As a result of these conflicting
rules, Mr. Peters' attorney will find that both England and the
state of New York will claim jurisdiction over his shares in the
Rolls-Royce Motor Company, Ltd.: New York, because the
certificates representing the shares are located in Mr. Peters' vault
in New York City; England, because of the necessity for registra-
tion on the books of the company in England in order to effect
transfer. For purposes of dealing with Mr. Peters' estate in
England, we must conclude that his shares are present there,
despite the actual location of the certificate in his vault in New
York City. Since this is so, it will be necessary to include them in
an English probate inventory, subject them to English death
duties, and distribute them in accordance with the appropriate
rules of English private international law.
A second potential asset of Mr. Peters' English estate consists
of another form of intangible movable property, namely his
deposit account in Barclay's Old Bank, Oxford. Because English
law regards a deposit account as nothing more than a debt owed
by a bank to its customer, it is necessary to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the debtor in order to invest a court with the
power to compel repayment."5 This can normally be obtained
only where the debtor is found, that is, where he is actually
physically present. Because of this requirement, the debt itself
has come to be regarded as situated in the country where the
12Brassard v. Smith (1925) A.C. 371: "Where could the shares be effectually
dealt with?"; Erie Beach Co. v. Attorney General (1930) A.C. 161; Rex v. Wil-
liams (1942) A.C. 541.
'3 Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 507.
14Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933), motion for reargu-
ment denied, 262 N.Y. 643, 188 N.E. 102 (1933).
15 Re Maudslay Sons & Field (1900) 1 Ch. 602; Re Banque des Marchands de
Moscou (1952) 1 All E.R. 1269; Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 504.
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debtor resides. The practical reasons behind this rule are even
more apparent in the case of banks in view of their fixed and
permanent location. Consequently, an English court of probate
would hold a deposit account in an English bank to be property
situated in England even though the pass book representing the
deposit was in New York, and, therefore, physically located out-
side of the jurisdiction. An extension of this rule was necessitated
by English banking practices. Because of the heavy emphasis on
branch banking in England, all accounts kept at a particular
branch are considered to be situated there.16 However, if a branch
has defaulted in payment after having been served with timely
demand, then the bank may be sued on the debt wherever it can
be found. Insofar as these rules apply to Mr. Peters, we may
conclude that his deposit account at Barclay's constitutes property
in England, that the Old Bank in Oxford is primarily responsible
for payment to Mr. Peters' administrators, but that should the
branch fail, it would be possible to look for satisfaction to Bar-
clay's Bank wherever it could be found.
Before leaving the question of situs, it is important to remem-
ber that an English court will be interested in the manner in
which Mr. Peters may choose to exercise his special power of
appointment by will. Although a power of appointment is not
itself property over which a court would have necessary jurisdic-
tion, nevertheless the circumstances surrounding the power held
by Mr. Peters would subject his exercise to English law. The
limitations of the trust providing for the special power of appoint-
ment were created under an English will; the trust corpus is
situated in England and is administered there; and the terms
of the power restrict its exercise to a testamentary instrument
which must necessarily be admitted to probate in England. As
a result of these circumstances, an English court will be properly
interested in the manner in which the power is exercised both
with regard to matters of formality as well as to the substance of
any interests created thereunder.
TEsTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION TO MR. PETERS' PROPERTY
Where, as in the case of Mr. Peters, an estate crosses national
borders, the laws in the several countries may give conflicting
16Arab Bank, Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank (1954) A.C. 495.
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answers to any given question. Especially in the case of intangi-
ble personal property, it is conceivable that several different
jurisdictions may claim the nexus not only to impose death taxes
upon the value of such property, but also to resolve important
questions of testate and intestate succession thereto. Under
current circumstances, for example, the state in which Mr. Peters
is domiciled, the country of incorporation of the company whose
shares he owns and the place in which the certificates of stock
are located at the time of his death may all seek to impose their
own particular rule of law in the event that he should die in-
testate. Before consideration can be given to the problems which
arise in the event that Mr. Peters should decide to adopt a
considered estate plan in respect of his English assets, it is neces-
sary to examine the rules of law by which questions of descent
and distribution to his property in England will be determined.
Although the property is situated in England, it does not neces-
sarily follow that an English court will impose English law only.
Under the rules of English private international law, an English
court will, under certain circumstances, apply the law of some
other jurisdiction.
A. INTESTACY AND TIIE CONCEPT OF SCISSION
In the event that Mr. Peters should die intestate, the succes-
sion to and the distribution of his estate in England would be
determined by English law not because English domestic law
would be the exclusive authority to which the court would look,
but because it would be within the province of the English court
to determine whether the law of some other jurisdiction should
be controlling. Furthermore, the rules of private international
law in England, unlike those which obtain in the United States,
have become a reasonably certain guide as to what the court will
do. Insofar as English private international law is concerned, the
circumstances under which the English court will apply foreign
rather than domestic law depends largely upon whether the
property in question is regarded as "movable" or "immovable."
During the development of the law in this area, England adopted
the principle of "scission" under which the succession to im-
movables is governed by rules different from those which control
succession to movables. Consequently, Mr. Peters' American
attorney can expect English treatment of the leasehold in Lon-
19641
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don to differ from the practice developed for dealing with his
shares, deposit accounts, and other forms of movable property.
Traditionally, intestate succession to immovable property has been
governed exclusively by the laws of the government within whose
territory the property is situated, the so-called lex situs. In
enunciating the scope of this rule, the court in Nelson v. Bridport
declared that "the incidents to real estate, the right of alienating
it, and the course of succession to it, depend entirely on the law
of the country where the estate is situated."'7 Thus, should Mr.
Peters die intestate, England will apply its own domestic law of
succession to his leasehold in London regardless of the fact that
he may have died domiciled elsewhere.'8
Insofar as Mr. Peters' movable assets are concerned, however,
an entirely different rule has been adopted, one based largely on
convenience, and known under the traditional maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam. This principle of almost two hundred years
standing, was first decided in Pipon v. Pipon, where the court
concluded that ". . . the personal estate follows the person, and
becomes distributable according to the law or custom of the
place where the intestate lived." 9 In the later case of Freke v.
Carbery, the court reaffirmed its earlier acceptance of this prin-
ciple, and explained the reasons for its formulation. "The doc-
trine," mobilia sequuntur personam, it said, "depends upon a prin-
ciple which is expressed in the Latin words; and that is the only
principle of the whole of our law as to domiil when applicable
to the succession of what we call personal estate." Furthermore,
it reasoned, such doctrine is accepted "not by any special law of
England, but by the deference which, for the sake of international
comity, the law of England pays to the law of the civilized world
generally.... ." And finally, restating the rule clearly, and recog-
nizing its application to a classification of property of which
personalty was but a part, the court concluded, "Where 'mobilia'
are in places other than that of the person to whom they belong,
their accidental situs is disregarded, and they are held to go
with the person."20 In applying the rule, however, it must be
17 Nelson v. Bridport (1845) 8 Beav. 547.
18 Balfour v. Scott (1793) 6 Bro. Cas. Par. 550; Duncan v. Lawson (1889)
41 Ch.D. 394.
'9 Pipon v. Pipon (1744) Amb. 25.2 0 Freke v. Carbery, supra note 8, at 466.
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observed that the law of the place of situs must initially determine
whether the property in question is movable or immovable. That
this may be significant is best illustrated by reference to Freke v.
Carbery, where the court determined that a lease, although
ostensibly a chattel real and, therefore, personal property, was
to be considered immovable and consequently subject in its
disposition to the law of the situs. Additionally, even though the
English court may determine property to be movable and, there-
fore, subject to the personal law of the decedents domicile,
reference must be made to the law as it stood at the date of the
decedent's death, subsequent changes being disregarded by Eng-
lish courts for purposes of determining succession.2' Similarly,
factors such as domicile of origin or place of birth or death are
wholly immaterial. Once the law of domicile is invoked, however,
it will be conclusive on all questions as to persons who take
shares in the decedents estate; what their proportionate shares
are to be; the order of succession; the rights of a surviving spouse;
the liability of a distributee for unpaid estate debts, and other
related questions. Thus, where, as in the case of Mr. Peters, a
decedent may die domiciled in the United States but leave mov-
able assets in England, administration of those assets must be
regulated by English law. But all questions of beneficial suc-
cession are to be answered by looking to the law of his domicile
as it existed at the time of his death. In the event that Mr. Peters
should die intestate, domiciled in New York, and leaving movable
property in England, then, the English court would look to the
New York law of succession in order to determine the proper
disposition of these assets. If subsequent to his death but prior to
the distribution of the estate the New York legislature should
amend its decedent estate law to increase, for example, the share
to which Mrs. Peters would be entitled, the English court would
disregard this amendment and award the widow's share according
to the law operative as of the date of Mr. Peters' death.
B. TESTATE SUCCESSION
In view of the fact that Mr. Peters will require a will in order
to execute his special power of appointment, it is important to
, 2 Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 268:
"The law of the place of domicil as it existed at the time of the death ought to
regulate succession."
1964]
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consider the role of English private international law insofar as it
controls testate succession to property situated in England. Again,
these rules have developed in accordance with the schismatic
division of property into the categories of "movable" and "im-
movable." This dual system appears to be a feature of common
law countries, and may result from the fact that in England free-
hold lands were not devisable until 1540,22 whereas this was pos-
sible with respect to movable property for many years prior to that
date. In discussing testate succession in English private inter-
national law, then, it is again necessary to approach the problems
which arise from the standpoint of "movables" and "immovables"
and, therefore, in analyzing Mr. Peters' estate we shall adhere
to this division. The primary problems Mr. Peter's attorney will
face appear when he seeks to have Mr. Peters' will admitted to
probate in England. Questions which arise at that time concern his
capacity to make a will; the formal validity in England of a will
executed in another jurisdiction; the material or essential validity
of the dispositions Mr. Peters may seek to make; and the problem
of revocation of an earlier will either by direct means such as
physical destruction or by indirect means such as subsequent
marriage. Although the same problems arise with respect both
to wills of movables and to wills of immovables, the applicable
law will not be the same and, consequently, the results will often
be different. Very similar questions could arise with respect to
the validity of inter vivos trusts of movable and immovable
property in England. However, such trusts have not received
much attention in English texts or treatises on private interna-
tional law principally, one would suppose, because of the recent
development of their use in England itself. For many years
trusts had been created by will only, and as a result questions
which arose dealt principally with the validity of the will rather
than of the trusts created thereunder. Thus, while the inter vivos
trust in conflict of laws has been the subject of considerable
discussion in the United States and has given rise to frequent
litigation here, quite the opposite has been the situation in
England. In fact, with the exception of inter vivos trusts created
upon marriage settlements,23 litigation involving inter vivos trusts
22 1540 Wills Act 32 Hen. 8 c. 1.
23 Van Grutten v. Digby (1862) 31 Beav. 516.
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in private international law has been almost non-existent. Con-
sequently, in our discussion of the aforementioned problems, we
shall deal with the application of English private international
law to wills only, bearing in mind that the rules applicable to Mr.
Peters' will could, we expect, be extended to cover inter vivos
trusts as well.
1. The Will Which Disposes of Immovables
As in the case of intestate succession to immovables in Eng-
land, we -find, not unexpectedly, that the appropriate rule of law
controlling just about every aspect of a will of immovables is the
law of the country in which the immovable is situated. The
law of the decedent's last domicile-his personal law-is com-
pletely disregarded in determining questions dealing with such a
will. 24 The application by the English courts of the law of the
situs extends with equal rigidity not only to matters of formality
required under English law for proper execution,25 but also to
questions dealing with the capacity of a testator to devise in -
movables;2 to the essential validity of interests he seeks to
create;2 and to the effect of revocation.m2 s
When the immovable is situated in England, as is the case
of Mr. Peters' leasehold in London, any will seeking to create
interests therein will be subject without exception to the English
rule against perpetuities, and even to the possibility that the
interest sought to be created is one which is no longer legally
permissible in England. An example of the latter contingency
arose in In re Hoyles, where a testamentary gift of land to charity
in excess of the amount legally permissible was invalidated,
although it would have been upheld had the gift consisted of
money. Of course, as in the case of Freke v. Carbery, supra note
8, where it lay within the jurisdiction of the English court to de-
termine whether a leasehold was to be considered a movable sub-
ject to the law of the testator's domicile or an immovable and,
therefore, subject to the law of its situs, the English court will in
24 Nelson v. Bridport, supra note 17, at 547.25 Coppin v. Coppin (1725) 2 P.Wms. 291; Pepin v. Bruyere (1900) 2 Ch.
504.
20 In re Hernando, Hernando v. Sawtell (1884) 27 Ch.D. 284.
27 Freke v. Carbery, supra note 8.2 8 In the Estate of Alberti (1955) 3 All E.R. 730.
2
91n re Hoyles, supra note 7; Mayor of Canterbury v. Wybum (1895) A.C.
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the first instance determine whether a gift to a foundation located
outside the United Kingdom, such as the New York City Com-
munity Chest, is a charitable institution under English law. This
may be important not only with respect to the validity of the gift,
but also insofar as the disposition may be exempt from United
Kingdom estate duty as a charitable bequest.30 Of course, a de-
termination with respect to the first issue may not necessarily
be conclusive so far as the latter is concerned.
The only aspect of any will Mr. Peters may make which,
although disposing of immovable property in England is governed
by the law of New York, is the construction of terminology he
has employed. In order to uphold the intent of a foreign testator
so far as is possible, the English court would probably depart
here from its rigid application of the law of situs. In so doing,
it would look to the law of Mr. Peters' domicile at the date the
will was executed. For example, should Mr. Peters devise his
leasehald in London to "My son Preston Peters IV and his heirs,
but if he should die without issue to the All Saints Church,
London," the term "die without issue" might be construed
according to the law of New York as it existed as of the date the
will was drawn. Since "die without issue" means "indefinite
failure of issue" in New York but "definite failure of issue" in
England, the application of the one rule of law rather than the
other would be of considerable significance. In the light of Studd
v. Cook,3' the only definitive English authority on this question,
it is not unreasonable to presume that the English court would
apply the law of New York. Even though the property is in
England, it is not essential that English law be applied in the
face of Mr. Peters' apparent intention. This view has been
adopted by some of England's most prominent authorities.
32
Similarly, should Mr. Peters devise his immovable property "to
my intestate heir," it is likely that his intention to use the word
"heir" in accordance with the meaning most familiar to him,
30 Camille & Henry Dreyfus Foundation, Inc. v. 1.0.. (1956) A.C. 89.
Although charitable bequests are not deductible for estate duty purposes in the
United Kingdom, if an inter vivos transfer is made to a charity more than one ya
before the donor's death, the amount of the gift will not be included inthe
donor's gross estate for purposes of the United Kingdom estate duty.
31 Studd v. Cook (1883) 8 App. Cas. 577.3 2 Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 528, Exception No. 6; Cheshire, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 607.
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namely as defined by the courts of New York, will be respected.33
In view of Chancery's historic effort to carry out the intentions
of a testator so far as they can be ascertained, it would seem
sensible to apply the law of the decedents domicile at the date
the will was drawn to questions of construction, except in those
cases where to do so would be contrary to strong English public
policy.
2. The Will Which Disposes of Movables
In drawing a will, Mr. Peters' attorney will want to remember
that entirely different standards apply in the event that the will
seeks to dispose of movables. Whereas in order to be effective
to dispose of his immovable property in England Mr. Peters' will
must conform to the laws of England, when he seeks to devise
his movable property situated in England this is not at all the
case. As could probably have been anticipated from the discus-
sion of intestate succession to movable property in England,
questions concerning the formal execution of Mr. Peters' will of
movables: 4 as well as those dealing with the essential validity of
any devise he may make therein 5 are answered by reference not
to the law of the situs of the property, but by reference to the law
of the place of Mr. Peters' last domicile. With respect to Mr.
Peters' testamentary capacity"6 and the construction of termi-
nology he may employ,37 the English court will probably refer
not to the law of Mr. Peters' last domicile, but rather to the law
of his domicile at the time the will was executed. In view of this
fact, it might be to Mr. Peters' advantage to employ two wills: one
conforming to the requirements of the English statute of wills3 s
in order to dispose of his immovable property in England, i.e., his
leasehold, and another conforming to the requirements of New
York which could be useful in disposing not only of his American
property not otherwise provided for, but also his movable prop-
erty in England such as his shares in the Rolls-Royce Motor
Company, Ltd., his deposit account at Barclay's Old Bank,
Oxford, and his special power of appointment. Of course, the
33 Enohin v. Wylie (1862) 10 H.L.C. 1, at 15.34 Bremer v. Freeman (1857) 10 Moo. P.C. 806.
35 Campbell v. Beaufoy (1859) John. 320.
36In the Goods of Maraver (1828) 1 Hagg. Ecc. 498.
37 Philipson-Stow v. I.R.C. (1961) A.C. 927.
38 1887 Wills Act 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. e. 26.
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decision to employ two wills must be arrived at in the light of
the form which Mr. Peters' overall estate plan will take, utmost
care being required in the drafting of revocation clauses lest
unforeseen and wholly undesirable consequences result.
The initial question of Mr. Peters' testamentary capacity will
arise when his attorney seeks to have Mr. Peters' will admitted to
probate. Regardless of what the English court might have decided
with respect to his will of immovables, the question will be inde-
pendently examined and determined solely upon the basis of the
law which obtained in the place of Mr. Peters' domicile at the
time he executed his will." Thus, it is entirely possible that, by
virtue of his domicile in New York, Mr. Peters may be deemed to
possess sufficient testamentary capacity to execute a will affecting
movable property in England even though he would not be able
to do so if his domicile were English, and for the lack of which
his will of immovables may already have been denied probate.
While it must be borne in mind that the rule governing the
question of capacity is subject to dispute, substantial authority
regards the law of Mr. Peters' domicile at the time the will was
executed as being dispositive.40
The law of last domicile, however, is emphasized insofar as
questions of formality of execution are concerned. In order to be
valid in England, Mr. Peters' will of movables must be valid in
New York. This would suppose either that it be executed in
conformity with the New York statute of wills, or, in the event of
execution elsewhere, that it could be saved in New York through
the application of an appropriate rule of New York conflict of
laws. The exclusive authority of the law of last domicile was first
established in Stanley v. Bernes, where the court, reversing a
decision on appeal, held a will of movables made according to
English law by a British subject domiciled in Portuguese Madeira
to be invalid in England because not in conformity with the laws
established in Madeira for the execution of wills.41 Similarly,
should Mr. Peters execute his will in conformity with the laws of
New York but subsequently acquire domicile in England, the
39 In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts (1918) 2 Ch. 391.40 Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 600, Rule 114; Cheshire, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 561.
41 Stanley v. Bernes (1830) 3 Hagg. Ecc. 373. See also Thornton v. Curling
(1824) 8 Sim. 310. This rule was applied in Bremer v. Freeman, supra note 34,
at 306,
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validity of the document would have to be determined under
English law, and not under the law of New York. The danger
inherent in a rule which looks only to the last domicile was made
manifest in the Bremer v. Freeman case. That result, which
jeopardized wills executed by British subjects in colonies all
around the world, was quickly overruled by Parliament with the
passage of Lord Kingsdowne's Act.42 Sections One and Two of
this Act allowed a wider choice of form than that of the testator's
last domicile for wills of personal estate made within or without
the United Kingdom. But these two sections are confined to wills
of British subjects and thus do not apply to Mr. Peters' will. It
has been suggested that Section Three of the Act can be construed
to cover aliens as well as subjects, but this view seems internally
inconsistent with the general purpose of the statute.43 A more
plausible but still speculative suggestion holds that Section Three
of the Act applies to the will of an alien in the event of his death
while domiciled in England.44 We can assume, therefore, that the
common law rule in its most rigid sense would be applied to Mr.
Peters' will of movables upon its submission to probate, and that
its validity in England would depend solely upon its validity
in the place of his last domicile.
After Mr. Peters' will of movables has been admitted to
probate in England, questions will then arise which deal solely
with the validity of the testamentary dispositions themselves,
with what has been termed the "essential validity" of his bequests.
Under the heading of "essential validity" are included such varied
problems as simultaneous deaths;45 lapsed legacies; 46 questions of
election;47 the effect of restraints upon alienation; and compliance
with the rule against perpetuities. Under the rule established
over one hundred and twenty five years ago in the case of
Thornton v. Curling, supra note 41, questions dealing with the
421861 Wills Act 24 and 25 Vict c. 114.
4131861 Wills Act, op. cit. supra note 42, § 3: "No will or other testamentary
instrument shall be held to be revoked or to have become invalid, nor shall the
construction thereof be altered, by reason of any subsequent change of dimieile
of the person making the same." In Re Groos (1904) P. 269, Section Three was
applied to the will of an alien.44 Dtcey's Conflict of Laws 820 (5th ed. by Keith 1932), refuted by Dr. J.
H. C. Morris in Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 626. See also Morris, Cases on
Private International Law 438 (3rd ed. 1960).451In re Cohen (1945) Ch. 5.46 In re Cunnington, Healing v. Webb (1924) 1 Ch. 68.47 In re Ogilvie (1918) 1 Ch. 492.
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essential validity of wills of movables can be answered with but
one exception, only by looking to the law of the place of last
domicile. Thus, if the law of New York would regard one of Mr.
Peters' testamentary dispositions as essentially invalid, the Eng-
lish court will direct that the property be distributed according to
New York law.
To what extent the law of the place of last domicile will not be
applied to questions of essential validity is as yet unclear. To date
the only example of exception to the general rule arose in a case
dealing with a foreign rule against perpetuities. Because the
impediment to the gift was based upon a reason deemed clearly
local in nature, the English court refused to apply the law of the
place of last domicile and thereby invalidate a disposition which
was not to take effect in England anyway.48 Although such
reasoning does not appear to present legitimate grounds for
departure from the general rule, the exception for foreign rules
against perpetuities would seem to be quite well established.
This exception could be of considerable importance to Mr. Peters.
Although the New York rule against perpetuities has been re-
cently amended to conform to the English period of lives in
being plus twenty one years, it still must be satisfied not only with
respect to remoteness of vesting but also to suspension of aliena-
tion as well. Should one of Mr. Peters' dispositions fail to fulfill
this latter requirement, however, it would not be necessarily
invalid. The English court would apply its own rule against
perpetuities which concerns itself with remoteness of vesting
only, and dispose of the question of essential validity in the light
of this single standard. Suppose, therefore, that Mr. Peters should
create a residuary trust in his will of movables with directions
to the trustees to pay the income "to my son Preston Peters IV
for his life, and upon his death to pay the income to his first born
son for life, and upon his death to pay over the principal to the
American Red Cross." While every interest in this disposition
must vest within the period prescribed by the New York rule, the
life interest in Mr. Peters' unborn grandson would fail in New
York nevertheless. Under New York Personal Property Law,
Section 15, all income trusts are spendthrift by definition; that is,
the income beneficiary may neither assign his interest in anticipa-
48 Fordyce v. Bridges (1848) 2 Ph. 497.
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ion, nor may his creditors reach it in satisfaction of their claims.
Since the gift to Mr. Peters' grandson contemplates an interest
in a person unborn as of the date of Mr. Peters' death, the possi-
bility exists that the period during which the alienation of the
trust could be suspended will exceed a period measured by twenty
one years after the death of lives in being as of the date the will
became effective. Since this is so, the second imperative of the
New York rule will not have been satisfied. However, in view of
substantial English authority, it would be reasonable for us to
presume that the trust contemplated in this illustration, together
with all the interests created thereunder, would be fully valid
in England.49
As would be the case with Mr. Peters' will of immovables, the
English court will construe language employed in a will of
movables not according to the law of Mr. Peters' last domicile,
but according to the law of Mr. Peters' domicile at the time the
will was executed.50 Once again, the object is to afford the widest
possible latitude in insuring an accurate interpretation of Mr.
Peters' language. In the recent case of Philipson-Stow v. Inland
Revenue Commissioner, supra note 87, Lord Denning emphasized
at page 727 that while there was no doubt that the proper law
regulating the ultimate disposition of movables was the law of
the testator's last domicile, "there is perhaps an exception in re-
gard to the construction of his will: for if a question arises as
to the interpretation of the will and it should appear that the
testator has changed his domicile between making his will and
his death, his will may fail to be construed according to the law
of his domicile at the time he made it: though in all other respects
it would be governed by the law of his domicile at the date of his
death." Of course, the law of the property's situs will be invoked
where to do otherwise would have the effect of validating a dis-
position neither permitted in England nor in accordance with its
strong public policy.51 And, contrary to the rule which obtains in
New York, there is but slight authority in England that Mr.
Peters could displace the law which would otherwise obtain by
49 Fordyce v. Bridges, supra note 48, at 497; Dr. J. H. C. Morris and W.
Barton Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities 21-22 (1956), citing Re Mitchner
(1922) St. R. Qd. 252; Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 610-611; Cheshire, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 575-576.
5 0 Enohin v. Wylie, supra note 33, at 15.
51 Nelson v. Bridport, supra note 17; In re Miller (1941) 1 Ch. 511.
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a deliberate selection of the law of some other jurisdiction such
as has been provided by New York Decedent Estate Law, Sec-
tion 47.- While testamentary selection of a favorable jurisdiction
is given full effect in many of the United States, this would not
appear to be the current rule in England.
3. Revocation of Wills
Before leaving the problem of Mr. Peters' will or wills, it is
necessary to discuss briefly the question of revocation. English
private international law regards the question of revocation as a
matter of succession, and as such it is governed by principles
which relate in the usual way to movables and immovables.
Revocation, itself, may be in the form either of the deliberate act
of the testator as by destruction of an old will and the execution
of a new one; or it may come about by operation of law, such as
through the testator's subsequent marriage. Should Mr. Peters
seek to revoke a will through a deliberate act, validity and effect
would probably depend upon the law of his last domicile insofar
as the will related to movable property, and upon the law of
England insofar as it related to immovable property. 3 Should Mr.
Peters decide upon the execution of two wills, great care must
be exercised in drawing not only revocation clauses but also
subsequent codicils as well. The result of faulty draftsmanship
is illustrated by In the Estate of Yahuda,5 where the testatrix,
who died domiciled in Connecticut, left four wills each disposing
of movable property situated in different countries including the
United States and England. The will bequeathing the English
movables was admitted to probate in England solely because it
had been previously proved in Connecticut. On this ground, the
court was able to avoid the cogent argument that the earlier
English will had been effectively revoked by a clause in the
subsequent Connecticut instrument. Had English probate prac-
tice been otherwise, it is not unlikely that an intestacy would
have resulted with respect to Mrs. Yahuda's English property.
5 2
In re Price, Tomlin v. Latter (1900) 1 Ch. 442.
53 In the Estate of Alberti, supra note 28, (where an unattested holographic
will valid by the law of the testator's last domicile was held ineffective to revoke
an English will of immovable property situated in England). See also In the
Estate of Wayland (1951) 2 All E.R. 1041.
54 In the Estate of Yahuda (1956) P. 388.
[Vol. 52,
ENGLISH PirvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Mr. Peters' attorney will want, therefore, to examine carefully
the effects of a revocation clause before he sees it effectuated.
Issues concerning revocation by operation of law are less
easily resolved. Where the question is whether a will has been
revoked or rendered null and void by subsequent marriage, Eng-
lish law raises the distinction between the law of succession and
the law of domestic relations. With respect to Mr. Peters' will
of movable property, it has been held in England that the effect
of any subsequent marriage is to be determined by the matri-
monial law of his domicile at the time of the marriage, and not as
a matter of testamentary law to be controlled by the law of his
domicile at the time of his death.5 5 It is not clear what the
English court would do with respect to a will of immovables,
however, although it would seem that the law of the situs would
be dispositive15 In England, marriage automatically revokes a
will unless, since 1925, the will had been made in contemplation
of marriage.57 Unlike the somewhat more simplified issue of
remarriage, the problem of change of domicile presents con-
siderably greater difficulty. While there is no relevant authority,
text writers such as Dicey58 and Johnson 9 suggest that the mere
change of domicile should not be permitted to nullify retro-
actively an act which was valid under the only law to which the
testator had been previously subject and to undo what had been
lawfully and intentionally effected in the past. 0 This view is
based upon an interpretation of Section Three of the 1861 Wills
Act which provides that "No will or other testamentary instru-
ment shall be held ... to have become invalid, nor shall the
construction thereof be altered, by reason of any subsequent
change of domicile of the person making the same." However,
as discussed above, there is considerable doubt as to whether
this section of the Act may be construed to apply to non-resident
aliens. The fact that a liberal view would have the effect of
saving many wills disposing of property in England might per-
55 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan (1900) P. 211.
G6 But cf., Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 530-531.
57 1837 Wills Act 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 26 s. 18; 1925 Law of Property Act
15 Geo. 5 c. 20 s. 177.
5 8 Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 835.
59 Johnson The Conflict of Laws 102-114 (1933).6 0 This o? course, is precisely the effect of change of domicile upon the
formal validity of wills of movables.
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suade the court to construe the relevant section to be of general
application to any will before it. However, prevailing textual
opinion appears to be irreconcilable with the conventional con-
struction of Section Three.
C. EXERCISING POWERS OF APPomTmENT
Before ending discussion of testate succession to Mr. Peters'
English estate, it is important to discuss the problems which
arise in respect of the trust created under his mother's will, of
which he is the income beneficiary and over whose corpus he
enjoys a power of appointment. Primarily because exercise of
Mr. Peters' special power will involve no adverse tax consequences
in the United States, but also because of the financial benefits
which will accrue to the appointees, Mr. Peters would be well
advised to exercise his special power of appointment. In so doing,
however, his attorney should not lose sight of the many conflict
of laws problems which will arise not only because the donor
and the donee of the power were not domiciled in the same
jurisdiction, but also because the appointive assets are located
in a jurisdiction other than that in which Mr. Peters will have
died comiciled. When, for example, the problem for considera-
tion is whether the exercise of the power violates the rule against
perpetuities, a determination can be made only in the light of the
appropriate law. Furthermore, should Mr. Peters decide not to
exercise the power, or should he exercise it in an improper way,
the question will then arise as to the selection of proper takers in
default of appointment. Although the terms of the instrument
provide for this contingency in the designation of Mr. Peters'
"children," a determination of whether such persons would include
adopted children can be made only after the appropriate law has
been selected."'
For purposes of English private international law, the power
of appointment has developed within the framework of very
definite conceptions. In exercising a special power, the donee is
treated not as though he were disposing of his own property, but
rather as though he were disposing of the donor's. This rule is
distinguished from that which applies to the exercise of general
6 1 Dr. J. H. C. Morris has suggested to me that these questions would be
determined by English law. See Re Fergusson (1920) 1 Ch. 483.
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powers of appointment, in which case the donee is considered to
be disposing of his own property.(2 In discussing English treat-
ment of powers of appointment, it is necessary to distinguish
between questions of capacity; 3 formality of execution;' and
essential validity of exercise.65 The problem of construction,
which arises in connection with Section 27 of the 1837 Wills Act,
need not be discussed here. Although Section 27 has been held
to extend to wills of testators domiciled abroad,66 the issue of
whether a general residuary bequest operates to include property
over which a testator had a power of appointment applies only
to general and not to special powers.
Under the rule established in In re Lewars Settlement Trusts,
supra note 39, Mr. Peters' capacity to exercise a power created by
an English instrument will be tested in the first instance by the
law of his domicile at the time of execution. This, however, is
not necessarily conclusive as complications arise in the event of
his incapacity under such law. Because English law regards the
donee of a special power as a mere agent for the donor of the
power, ultimate authority must rest with the law under which the
instrument creating the power is subject. Consequently, although
Murphy v. Deichler, supra note 64, is limited to questions of
formal validity, it may be legitimately inferred that the exercise of
the power will be upheld if Mr. Peters has capacity under English
law if not under the law of his domicile at the time of execution.
Thus, even though Mr. Peters may be deemed to lack capacity in
New York, he would not necessarily be barred from exercising
his special power of appointment.
It should not be forgotten that Mr. Peters' will of movables
will derive its formal validity from the law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion. However, the formal validity of a will exercising a special
power of appointment depends on considerations which differ
from those of any other will. Again, this difference is based upon
the view that the donee of the power is disposing not of his own
property, but rather that of the donor. Consequently, the formal
6 2 Re Price (1900), supra note 52.
6 3 In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts, supra note 39.
64 D'Huart v. Harkness (1865) 34 Beav. 324; Re Price, supra note 52; Murphy
v. Deichler (1909) A.C. 446.6 5 Pouey v. Hordern (1900) 1 Ch. 492; In re Pryce (1911) 2 Ch. 286; Re
Waite's Settlement (1958) Ch. 100.6 6 Re Price, supra note 52; Re Waite's Settlement, supra note 65.
6 7 Morris, op. cit. supra note 44, at 455.
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validity of Mr. Peters' testamentary exercise of his power will be
sustained, if possible, under English law in the event that it
should fail under the law of his last domicile. Although Re Price,
supra note 52, decided that a will executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the testator's last domicile
is a good exercise of a power to appoint movables, in Murphy v.
Deichler, supra note 64, the court admitted a document to pro-
bate in England for the purpose of the appointment only, even
though it could not be proved as a will since it failed to conform
to foreign statutory requirements. In sustaining its validity for
the limited purpose, the court said at page 446, "It is a proper
exercise of an English power to appoint by will if it be exercised
by a will in the English form even though the person appointing
be domiciled abroad and the will be not validly executed accord-
ing to the law of domicile." This is, again, another example of
liberal English treatment with respect to testamentary disposi-
tions and of the practice of sustaining, if at all possible, the in-
tentions of a decedent.
6 8
Insofar as questions of substance are concerned, the English
character of Mr. Peters' special power of appointment means
that the essential validity of any dispositions he may create will
be governed by English and not by New York law. This decision
was reached in Pouey v. Hordern, supra note 65, where the court
held substantive rules of law of the testator's last domicile in-
applicable to property subject to a special power of appointment
created by an English instrument. Again, the ruling was based
on the theory that the donee was not dealing with his own prop-
erty, but was acting as an agent carrying out the wishes of the
donor. While such treatment could be extended to cover gen-
eral powers of appointment as well, this would appear to be
unjustified inasmuch as property subject to a general power of
appointment is unquestionably regarded as belonging to the
donee of the power and should be distributed accordingly. 9
Thus, Mr. Peters' special power over funds in England given
by an English instrument may be exercised in a manner contrary
to the law of his last domicile.
Although discussion of substantive rules of English property
68 See also Tatnall v. Hankey (1838) 2 Moo.P.C. 342.69 In re Pryce, supra note 65; see also Dicey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 648-644.
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and testamentary law are beyond the scope of this paper, it is
necessary to depart from this limitation with respect to the rule
against perpetuities. Because there is no absolute ownership in
Mr. Peters, exercise of the power is read back into the will of the
donor, his mother. If this were not so, that is if the period of the
rule were held to run not from the date of the creation of the
power but from the date of its exercise, "property could be
appointed from settlement to settlement in perpetuity without
ever coming under the control of an absolute owner."70 Under
the English rule, then, even if the power itself is valid, an interest
created under it may be too remote if it might not vest within the
period of the rule measured from the date of the creation of the
power.71 The period of the rule continues to be twenty-one years
after the death of lives in being ascertainable from the date when
the instrument creating the power took effect, and interests
created through exercise of the power must vest if they are ever
going to vest within the period of the rule. The only significant
departure from the traditional application of the rule permits
facts in existence at the time the appointment is made to be taken
into account in testing the validity of the exercise. 72 Conse-
quently, an interest which would have been void for remoteness
had it been created by Mr. Peters' mother will be upheld under
an appointment made by Mr. Peters if the facts which made
hypothetical remoteness conceivable in the former case no longer
possible in the latter. The Law Reform Committee, in its Fourth
Report published in London in 1956, considered revision of the
English rule against perpetuities. Insofar as the rule affects
powers of appointment, however, no changes were recommended.
In discussing the so-called "wait and see" aspect of the rule with
respect to powers of appointment, the committee held that
"Measuring the period of the rule from the date of the creation
of the power, and taking into consideration all facts known as of
the date of exercise, if the appointee's interest must vest if it is
ever going to vest within the period of the rule, then the appoint-
ment is good even though had it been made by the donor of the
7 0 Morris and Leach, op. cit. supra note 49, at 140.
71 Jarman on Wills 329-331 (8th ed. R. Jennings 1951); Re Brown & Sibley's
Contract (1876) 3 Ch.D. 156; Re Thompson (1906) 2 Ch. 199.
72Willcinon v. Duncan (1861) 30 Beav. 111.
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power it would have been too remote."7 3 With respect to powers
of appointment, then, embarassing situations created by the
"fertile octagenarian" and the "unborn widow" may be fully
avoided.
ADMUNSTRATION AND TAXATiON
A. ADMNISTRATION
In England, the only person entitled to wind up the affairs of
Mr. Peters' estate would be a personal representative to whom a
grant of probate or letters of administration had been made by an
English court. Unlike the continental system which imposes the
duties of administration upon the heir or legatee, in England (as
in the United States) these responsibilities fall to either the
executor (if one has been appointed by will), the administrator
cum testamento annexo (in the event of failure to make an ap-
pointment), or to an administrator (in the event of intestacy).
The principal duties of administration include collecting the
assets of the estate, discharging its debts and obligations, and
distributing the remaining balance to the appropriate bene-
ficiaries. 74 Because Mr. Peters will have died domiciled in New
York, the principal administration of his estate will have to be
taken out in the Surrogate's Court of New York County. While
it would be preferable to have but one administration for all of
Mr. Peters' estate regardless of its location, this is not currently
possible. Under English law, the title of an administrator ap-
pointed by a foreign court relates only to property within the
jurisdiction of the appointment, and carries no rights with re-
spect to property in England. 5 Consequently, a separate grant
of administration will have to be obtained from the English
court before anyone may deal with the assets whose situs we have
determined to be in England. Although Mr. Peters' principal
administrator cannot expect to obtain an English grant solely on
the strength of his New York appointment,76 it has been the
usual rule to award the English grant to the principal adminis-
trator because he has been authorized under the laws of the
73 The Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, "The Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," London (1956).
74 The main principles of grant of administration are found in Non-Contentious
Probate Rules, 1954, contained in the Annual Practice of the Supreme Court.7 5 New York Breweries Co. v. Attorney General (1899) A.C. 62.7 6 In the Goods of Briesemann (1884) P. 260.
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decedent's last domicile. In In the Goods of Earl, the court stated
what has been the basis of English practice for almost one hun-
dred years: ".... the court... ought to make a grant... to the
person who has been clothed by the court of the country of
domicile with the power and duty of administering the estate, no
matter who he is or on what ground he has been clothed with
the power."77 While this rule is subject to numerous exceptions,78
and is based on purely discretionary grounds, a grant of authority
to the principal administrator has seldom been denied. The
current rule of law was established in In the Goods of Hill, the
court there stating that ". . . where the court of the country of
the domicile of the deceased makes a grant to a party .. . [the
English court] ought, without further consideration, to grant
power to that person to administer the English assets." 79 Never-
theless, the normal practice is for the principal administrator to
apply for the appointment of an Attorney Administrator of the
assets in England, rather than to take out ancillary probate
himself.80
B. Tim ENGLISH ESTATE DUTY
When Mr. Peters dies, his estate will be taxed by several
jurisdictions. Consequently, it is necessary to review the question
of Mr. Peters' multiple tax liabilities, and the extent to which he
is relieved from the burden of double taxation by the credit
afforded under 1954 Internal Revenue Code Sec. 2014 for taxes
payed to a foreign country, and by the Double Taxation Relief
Convention of 1946 between the United States and the United
Kingdom. Of course, it is the nature of the English estate duty
which will determine the maximum usefulness of the latter two
saving devices.
77 n lthe Goods of Earl (1867) L.R. 1 R.&D. 450.78 See, for example, In the Goods of Her Royal Highness The Duchess
D'Orleans (1850) 1 Sw. & Tr. 253 (where the court denied powers of admninistra-
tion to an infant).79 1n the Goods of Hill (1870) 62 P. & D. 89.
80For further authority on aspects of administration, see In re Lorrilard
(1922) 2 Ch. 638; 1932 Administration of Justice Act 22 & 23 Geo. 5 c. 55
s. 2(1) amending the 1925 Supreme Court of Judicature (consolidation) Act 15 &
16 Geo. 5 c. 49; Re Northcote's Will Trusts (1949) 1 All E.R. 442; Probate Practice
Directions Relating to Conflict of Laws in Administration, Direction of 5 May 1953,
2 All E.R. 1154; In the Estate of Yahuda, supra note 54; Non-Contentious Probate
Rules, 1954, Nos. 18, 29, 30, 34, 42, 52 and 53, set out in Webb & Brown, A Case-
book on the Conflict of Laws 418-420 (1960); Tristram & Coote, Probate Practice
(20th ed. 1955).
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Unlike the comprehensive gift tax scheme which prevails in
the United States, the English death duty is not buttressed by a
complementary system of inter vivos gift taxation beyond a very
insignificant ad valorem stamp duty payable according to the
value of the property conveyed or transferred and determined
as of the date of the disposition.81 Aside from this, the only duties
imposed on gifts occur in the event that they should be made less
than five years before the death of the donor in which case they
are included in the property which passes on death for the
purpose of levying the estate duty, and resemble the "gift in
contemplation of death" found in Sec. 2035 (a) of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code.8 As a result of the 1960 Finance Act,
however graduated provisions now exist which reduce the value
of the gift on a progressive basis, e.g., over two years, by fifteen
per cent, over three years, by thirty per cent, and over four years,
by sixty per cent.8 3 Under ordinary rules of common law, of
course, any incomplete gift, that is, one where bona fide possession
and enjoyment to the exclusion of the donor is not assumed im-
mediately upon the gift and fully retained thereafter, remains
property of the donor and for purposes of the death duty, there-
fore, is taxable as "property passing" on his death.8 4 From this
discussion, then, Mr. Peters would be well advised to give away
the bulk of his English estate so as to avoid the burden of what
will be shown to be a very heavy English estate duty. Only the
renunciation of Mr. Peters' life estate requires certain technical
treatment; however, as the trust is drawn, this would not be
difficult to achieve.8
81 1891 Stamp Act 54 & 55 Vict. c. 89; 1909-1910 Finance Act 10 Edw. 7 and
1 Geo. 5 c. 8 s. 74; 1942 Finance Act 5 & 6 Geo. 6 c. 21 s. 44.
82 Gifts to charity are brought back into the English estate only when
made within one year of the donor's death.
83 1960 Finance Act 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 c. 44 s. 64.
84 Moreover, 1952 Income Tax Act 15 & 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2 c. 10 s. 404,
ipss tax liability upon the donor for income derived from property in which
hehsretained an interest or power of revocation.
85 1940 Finance Act 3 & 4 Geo. 6 c. 29 s. 43; 1959 Finance Act 7 & 8 Eliz. 2
c. 58 §§ 43 and 44. These sections seek to eliminate the avoidance of estate duty
by the purported surrender of a life interest. The kind of scheme aimed at is one
whereby the life tenant and the remainderman surrender their interests to a com-
p any for shares, the remainderman taking the shares and the life tenant taking a
lfe income from the company in the form of directors fees: in the result, the life
tenant would receive an income for life equivalent to what he would have had
in respect of his life estate, but the property would have escaped estate duty
because it passed during the lifetime of the beneficiary and not on his death. The
above sections, however, are in terms wide enough to cover cases of disposition or
(Continued on next page)
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Inasmuch as the gifts proposed could be brought back into
Mr. Peters' estate under the English five year rule, it is necessary
for us to see how they will then be treated. The heart of the
English estate duty is contained in the first section of the 1894
Finance Act which provides for a graduated duty "In the case
of every person dying after the commencement of this Part of
the Act, [which] shall... be levied and paid upon the principal
value... of all property, real and personal, settled or not settled,
which passes on the death of such person... called "Estate Duty.
*"M. The important concept of "Passing" is not specifically
defined, but Section 2(1) of the 1894 Finance Act does provide
not only for property of which the decedent was "competent to
dispose," but also property in which the decedent or any other
person had an interest which ceased upon his death (e.g., life
estates per autre vie). Case law has contributed little to a more
comprehensive definition of "passing," but we are given to under-
stand that it may be taken to mean, simply, "changing hands,"
and appears to denote some actual change in the title or posses-
sion of the property which takes place as a result of death.
8 7
With respect to settled property liable for estate duty, a definition
of "settled" may be found in the 1925 Settled Land Act"" as well as
in the 1894 Finance Act. Unlike the Federal estate tax which does
not tax the value of life estates, the English estate duty requires
a tax to be payed on the principal value of settled property to
the extent of the decedents interest in the income. Again, the
basis for such taxation lies in the concept of "passing," the value
of the benefit to the remainderman accruing from the termination
of a prior interest which is deemed to "change hands" upon the
death of the life beneficiary.8 9 Thus, while Mr. Peters' life interest
in the trust created under his mother's will would not be taxed
in the United States, it would be fully liable for estate duty in
the United Kingdom. And, as Mr. Peters is the sole income
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
determination of life interests, whether or not they involve the acquisition of
property by a company.
86 1894 Finance Act 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30 ss. 1 and 2(1) (passing); see also
1939 Finance Act 2 & 3 Geo. 6 c. 109 s. 23; 1940 Finance Act, op. cit. supra
note 85, ss. 43 and 46.87 Nevill v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1924) A.C. 385 at 398; Attorney
Feneral v. Milne (1941) A.C. 765 at 779.
88 1925 Settled Land Act 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 18 s. 1.
89 1894 Finance Act, op. cit. supra note 86, s. 7(7).
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beneficiary, the full value of the corpus, 250,000 pounds, would
be deemed property taxable under Section 1 of the 1894 Finance
Act. This difference in treatment between the United States
and the United Kingdom with respect to estate taxation of life
interests in trusts has important consequences both with respect
to the credit allowed by the United States for foreign taxes paid,
as well as for the application of the Double Taxation Relief Con-
vention of 1946.
Although it has been English practice, in the case of decedents
dying domiciled outside of the United Kingdom, to subject to
estate duty only property situated (as determined by English
law) within the United Kingdom, liability for estate duty may be
imposed even though succession to movable property in England
is determined by the application of foreign law." This voluntary
limitation on its potential power to tax is codified in the 1949
Finance Act, which confirms that property situated out of the
United Kingdom will not be subject to English estate duty if it
can be shown that the proper law regulating its devolution or
disposition is the law neither of England nor of Scotland, and
either that the decedent did not die domiciled in any part of
Great Britain, or that the property is "immovable" under the law
of its situs.91 Since 1962, however, foreign immovable property of
persons dying domiciled in the United Kingdom has been subject
to estate duty.92 As we shall see, in cases governed by the double
taxation convention, the general rules for determining situs are
replaced by special situs codes although only for the purpose of
determining estate duty and not for determining questions of
descent and distribution. Since Mr. Peters will have died domi-
ciled in New York, and since such questions of situs will be
determined by the appropriate provisions of the Anglo-American
double taxation convention, he is fully within the protection of
Section 28(2) of the 1949 Finance Act. When such questions have
been finally determined, Mr. Peters' administrators, under current
rates, will be liable for a tax varying from one per cent should his
estate exceed the value of 5,000 pounds, to eighty per cent in the
90 See, for example, Winans v. Attorney General, supra note 1, where a
domiciled American was taxed on the value of bearer bonds situated in England.
91 1949 Finance Act 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 47 s. 28(2).
92 1962 Finance Act 10 & 11 Eliz. 2 c. 44 s. 27,
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event that it is greater than 1,000,000 poundsY3 Under the
"marginal relief" rates established in the 1914 Finance Act, 4
an estate will never be liable for more estate duty than the
maximum amount payable at the rate next below that which is
appropriate, plus the amount by which the estate exceeds the
turning point in the scale. For example, if the taxable estate was
302,000 pounds, the duty thereon at sixty-five per cent (the rate
for an estate exceeding 300,000 pounds but not 500,000 pounds)
would be 196,300 pounds. The highest amount of duty at the
next lower rate, i.e., sixty per cent on estates exceeding 200,000
pounds but not 300,000 pounds is 180,000 pounds. This, with the
addition of the 2,000 pounds excess value, makes 182,000 pounds
in all the amount which is to be paid. If we assume, therefore,
that Mr. Peters' English estate will include his leasehold, deposit
account, company shares, and equitable life estate, its gross
value will approximate 310,000 pounds. Reducing this amount
by 8,000 pounds for expenses of administration, claims against
the estate and any indebtedness owing to English creditors, the
balance of 302,000 pounds will be taxed at the rate of sixty-five
per cent, and will be liable for 196,300 pounds. After the ap-
plication of the marginal relief rates, the final tax to be paid will
be 182,000 pounds. No legacy or succession duty is payable to
Her Majesty's government, these having been abolished in the
1949 Finance Act.95
C. THE AmaucA CREDrr
Against the estate tax imposed by the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code on citizens (including domiciliaries) of the United States, a
credit is allowed for estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes
actually paid to any foreign country on property situated within
the foreign country and included in the decedents gross estate.90
This credit, however, is not altogether effective to prevent
double taxation. Since the credit is limited to property included
in the gross estate, the bulk of Mr. Peters' English assets will be
93 1963 Finance Act 11 & 12 Eliz. 2 c. 25 s. 52.
94 1914 Finance Act 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 10 s. 13 (1).
05 1949 Finance Act, op. cit. supra note 91 s. 27(1).96lInt. Rev. Code of 1954 Sec. 2014. This credit may be ]partially lost when
marital deduction or charitable gifts are involved in the estate plan, unless there is
excluded from such gifts property eligible for the foreign death tax credit.
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ineligible. Regardless of whether Mr. Peters chooses to exercise
his special power of appointment, the value of the trust corpus
will not be included in his gross estate for Federal estate tax
purposes.T Similarly, any English estate duty levied on Mr.
Peters' shares in the Rolls-Royce Motor Company, Ltd. will be
unavailable for the credit, since the duty will have been levied
on property not recognized to be situated in Englandf 8 There-
fore, despite the very heavy English estate duty which his estate
will be required to bear, Mr. Peters will be entitled only to a
small credit against his Federal estate tax. Under Sec. 2014(b),
the credit may not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio
to the amount of the English estate duty actually paid, as the
value of the property "situated within" England, subject to the
English estate duty, and included in the gross estate for Federal
estate tax purposes bears to the value of all property subject to
the English estate duty. Furthermore, the allowable credit may
not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to the total
Federal estate tax, as the value of the property "situated within"
England, subject to the English estate duty, and included in the
gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes bears to the value
of the entire gross estate subject to the Federal estate tax. To
illustrate this formula, let us suppose an English estate of 900,000
dollars, the estate duty on which is eligible for credit against
the Federal estate tax only in part because certain property
subject to the English estate duty is not includible in the gross
estate tax for Federal estate tax purposes. If the full estate duty
actually paid to the English government is 546,000 dollars, and
the creditable estate duty is levied on property valued at 150,000
dollars, then the maximum credit available is only 91,000 dollars,
or 162/3 per cent of the estate duty. However, if we assume
additional property valued at 850,000 dollars, there will be a
total gross estate of 1,000,000 dollars for Federal estate tax pur-
poses. If the entire Federal estate tax is 100,000 dollars, then the
original credit of 91,000 dollars will have to be further reduced,
resulting in a final allowable credit of only 15,000 dollars, or
something under three per cent of the estate duty. Consequently,
although an estate duty of 546,000 dollars will have been paid
9 7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 2041(a).9 8 Hutchinson v, Ross, supra note 14.
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to the English government, only 15,000 dollars of this amount
can be used to offset the estate tax payable to the United States.
D. THE DouBLE TAXATION BE=IF CoNvENnoN oF 1946
In 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom concluded
a convention and protocol called The Double Taxation Relief
(Estate Duty), for the purpose of eliminating the heavy burden of
double estate taxation. It was not the objective of the convention
to prevent either the United States or the United Kingdom from
taxing non-domiciliary property situated within its territory.
Indeed, it was agreed that such taxation would continue. Further-
more, in the case of United States citizens dying domiciled in any
part of the United Kingdom, it was agreed that, in determining
the amount or rate of the estate tax, property situated outside of
the taxing territory would be included.9 It would seem that a con-
vention which failed to limit the taxing powers of countries with
respect to multi-national estates would be of little value. Simi-
larly, inasmuch as it is within the sovereignty of each country
to abstain unilaterally from taxing property of its decedent
domiciliaries located in foreign countries, such a treaty would
indeed appear to be unnecessary. The heart of the Convention
and the reason for its being is found in Article V, Section (1)
which provides that ".... where one Contracting Party imposes
tax by reason of a decedents being domiciled in some part of its
territory or being its national, that Party shall allow against so
much of its tax.., as is attributable to property situated in the
territory of the other Contracting Party, a credit... equal to so
much of the tax imposed in the territory of the other Party as is
attributable to such property." What the treaty achieves, there-
fore, is bilateral agreement with respect to the situs of property,
something which neither party is unilaterally competent to do.
Thus, each country may continue to apply its own domestic law
for purposes of estate taxation as well as for determination of
questions of descent and distribution. But if a tax extends to
property whose situs, as determined by the treaty, is outside the
bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, then it must be offset by a
credit measured by the duty levied in the country of situs. The
99 Article IV, Section 2(a) and (b).
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application of the treaty can be illustrated by recalling certain
of the tax liabilities which will be imposed on Mr. Peters' estate.
UncTer the broad taxing powers of the United States, an estate
tax will be levied on Mr. Peters' deposit account in Barclay's Old
Bank, and on the value of his shares in the Rolls-Royce Motor
Company, Ltd. Furthermore, as we have seen, although this
property will be liable for English estate duty, no credit will be
available because neither asset is recognized to be situated in
England. Under the terms of the treaty, however, this burden
is eased through the application of the situs codes found in
Article III. Mr. Peters' deposit account, recognized to be a simple
debt, is deemed to be situated "at the place where the decedent
was domiciled at the time of death".100 Mr. Peters' shares are
deemed to be situated "at the place in or under the laws of which
[the] corporation was created or organized." 10' Thus, with respect
to the deposit account, ultimate authority to tax rests with the
United States, and a credit must be allowed against the English
estate duty. And with respect to the shares, the English nation-
ality of the company compels the United States to allow the
credit which it had previously denied. Credit under the Con-
vention as well as under Section 2014 is now available with
respect to Mr. Peters' leasehold, since interests in real property
situated outside the United States are now includible in the
gross estates of citizens of the United States.'
Unfortunately, no provision was made for the taxation of
trusts. If Mr. Peters' power of appointment should become tax-
able in the United States, it would seem that the spirit of the
treaty would require a credit to be allowed either against the
United States estate tax, or against the English estate duty. In
the absence of any express provisions, such a credit could be
computed by invoking the situs provisions of Article III and
applying them to each asset in the trust corpus, valued as of the
date of Mr. Peters' death.
100 Article III, Section (2)( c).
101 Article III, Section (2d).
'0 2 Revenue Act of 1962, Section 18.
